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Abstract: This paper focuses on the way in which the student loan system in 
the United States functions as a means of value-generation via the creation of 
indebted students. In order to exhibit the way in which the student loan system 
functions in this manner, the first section focuses on the relationship between 
labor and value, by discussing Marx’s analysis of labor-power and the generation 
of surplus value and Althusser’s notion of Ideological State Apparatuses. For 
both Marx and Althusser, value-generation relates directly to labor, but this 
changes as we shift from disciplinary societies to what Deleuze calls societies 
of control, which is the subject of the second part of the paper. In control 
societies, value is not just generated piecemeal, via labor, but permanently, via 
debt. Drawing on the work of Lazzarato and Serres, the third section folds the 
student loan system into this framework, showing how it functions immanently 
and parasitically on students to generate value outside of the sphere of work. 
The conclusion suggests that, despite its ubiquity, such indebtedness can also 
function as a locus for struggle. 
Key words: debt, student loans, Marx, Althusser, Deleuze, Lazzarato, Serres, 
Higher Education Act of 1965, societies of control, debt resistance
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Higher education makes numerous promises and is, for the most part, 
considered an irreducible value to the overall well-being of contemporary 
societies. Although like many I consider education an essential good, I take a 
different line in what follows, providing a general discussion of the manner in 
which the student loan system in the United States functions as a means of 
value-generation. As they force individuals into debt to gain access to future 
security, colleges and universities become factories for the generation of  
immediate, monetary value via students and their debt. In order to make this 
argument, I first cover what might be considered well-trodden terrain, focusing 
in the first section on Marx’s discussion of labor-power and its relation to the 
generation of surplus-value. This leads into a discussion what Althusser referred 
to as Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs), and they way in which they function 
to support the generation of value via labor. The point of this discussion is to 
provide a framework for understanding a shift in the function of education, 
which I discuss in the second section in terms of Deleuze’s distinction between 
disciplinary societies and control societies. Whereas the line that runs from Marx 
to Althusser conceives of the generation of value in terms of labor, with ISAs 
providing crucial, but ultimately external, support for the reproduction of the 
means of production, the shift that Deleuze marks conceives of the generation 
of value immanently, via debt. In the third section, I discuss this shift specifically 
in terms of student loans, drawing on Maurizio Lazzarato’s notion of the 
indebted subject and Michel Serres’s image of the parasite to conceptualize the 
function of student loans. On my reading, student loans become a means for the 
generation of value outside the sphere of labor, and turn subjects into perpetual 
generators of value. It is this condition that needs to be challenged, which I 
gesture toward in the conclusion in terms of collective refusal.  
Value, Work, and ISAs
It is well known that capitalism, at least in its basic, material forms, depends 
on the production of surplus-value via labor to generate profit. According 
to Marx, labor-power—i.e. the aggregate of mental and physical capacities 
and capabilities that define human life— can function as a specific type of 
commodity, in that its use-value is simultaneously a source of value. What it can 
be used for, in other words, coincides with what it is, and it is this coincidence 
that the capitalist exploits in production. Marx no doubt conceives of human 
activity in general in ontological terms; his discussion of alienated labor assumes 
as much, in that one can only be alienated from a prior condition, however 
abstractly we might characterize the latter.1 But labor-power in and of itself 
is only a commodity in light of other commodities, that is, from within an 
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established system of exchange. Hence, various conditions must be in place in 
order for labor-power to function as a source of value. First, Marx notes that 
the possessor of labor-power must have it at his or her disposal, meaning that 
he or she must be in a position to sell it freely for a specified period of time 
in the marketplace to a potential buyer. “He and the owner of money meet in 
the market,” Marx writes, “and enter into relations with each other on a footing 
of equality as owners of commodities, with the sole difference that one is a 
buyer, the other a seller; both are therefore equal in the eyes of the law.”2 A 
labor-relationship based on the putative equality of buyer and seller is thus 
fundamentally different from slavery. Slavery certainly conceives of individuals 
as a source of value, but the means through which the buyer extracts that value 
are essentially forced; in slavery, Marx points out, an owner of the commodity 
becomes him- or herself a commodity. 
 Second, although based upon a notion of equality in the marketplace, the 
conditions that underpin the selling of labor as a commodity are fundamentally 
asymmetrical and tilted toward the buyer. One only sells one’s labor, in other 
words, if one lacks access to other commodities that could generate value for 
the individual. One sells one’s labor-power, in other words, because at the end 
of the day that is all one has to sell. Marx thus notes that the owner of money 
finds labor-power for sale as a commodity because “the possessor of labor-
power, instead of being able to sell commodities in which his labor has been 
objectified, must rather be compelled to offer for sale as a commodity that 
very labor-power which exists only in his living body.”3 Control of the means of 
production, in other words, is necessary if one is to avoid selling one’s labor-
power as a commodity. There is, Marx insists, nothing natural about such an 
arrangement. As mentioned above, labor appears as a commodity in relation to 
other commodities, which means that it depends upon an established system of 
exchange. Whatever form the latter might take, including varieties of capitalism, 
the relationship between buyer and seller, owner and worker, “is clearly the 
result of past historical development, the product of many economic revolutions, 
of the extinction of a whole series of older formations of social production.”4 
Nevertheless, when it appears as such, it is essentially a forced relationship, in 
that the subordinate party (i.e. the seller of labor-power) mainly enters into it 
due to a lack, specifically a lack of other means of generating individual value. To 
put the matter more bluntly, one works because one has to.5
 The asymmetry involved is, in turn, fundamental to the generation of 
surplus value. At its root the value of labor-power is determined at the threshold 
of the maintenance of labor-power itself. That is, in order for labor-power to 
reproduce itself, at the very least the basic needs of the laborer must be met. 
Indeed, this is why the individual sells his or her labor in the first place, to gain 
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access to the market of commodities in which he or she sold his or her labor. 
But the buyer of labor-power, the owner of money and the means of production, 
also holds interest in the subsistence of the worker, since the latter’s overall well-
being is directly related to his or her productive capacities. What counts toward 
well-being is not set in stone, although a certain level of subsistence appears as 
a requirement. Nevertheless, that level can vary considerably depending upon 
the conditions and expectations of a given market. Marx writes:
His means of subsistence must therefore be sufficient to maintain 
him in his normal state as a working individual. His natural needs, 
such as food, clothing, fuel and housing vary according to the 
climatic and other physical peculiarities of his country. On the 
other hand, the number and extent of his so-called necessary 
requirements, as also the manner in which they are satisfied, are 
themselves products of history, and depend therefore to a great 
extent on the level of civilization attained by a country; in particular 
they depend on the conditions in which, and consequently on the 
habits and expectations with which, the class of free workers has 
been formed.6
An increased standard of living, even to the point of relative excess, then, does 
not obviate the fundamental asymmetry in the relationship. Indeed, as Andre 
Gorz has pointed out, private comfort in the form of excess may enable the 
employer to extract more from the worker, since compensation in the form of a 
“comfortable, opulent, hedonistic lifestyle” demand in the workplace “a spirit of 
competition and opportunism, combined with subservience towards superiors.”7
 Nevertheless, the owners of money and the means of production, 
moreover, have a stake in keeping things at subsistence levels, relatively 
understood. This is not primarily because they are exceptionally greedy and 
immoral, although they may very well be. It is, rather, about keeping costs down 
in order to maximize competitiveness, profit, and reinvestment. Marx notes that 
the capitalist has two main goals in harnessing labor-power for the purpose of 
production. First, he or she wants to produce a specific commodity that can be 
bought and sold in the market; as Marx puts it, the objective is “to produce a 
use-value which has exchange-value.”8 Second, the capitalist wants to produce 
a commodity whose value is greater than the total value that went into its 
production. The total value involved includes the means of production but also 
the cost of labor. The overall objective, then, is “to produce not only use-value 
but a commodity; not only use-value, but value; and not just value, but also 
surplus-value.”9 In this sense, the production of surplus-value, which is really 
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the end goal, depends upon the extraction of value from labor-power; indeed, 
from the viewpoint of the capitalist, this is what the individual qua worker is: 
a source of value. Marx writes, “By turning his money into commodities which 
serve as the building materials for a new product, and as factors in the labor 
process, by incorporating living labor into their lifeless objectivity, the capitalist 
simultaneously transforms value, i.e. past labor in its objectified and lifeless form, 
into capital, value which can perform its own valorization process, an animated 
monster which begins to ‘work,’ ‘as if its body were by love possessed.’10
 The sphere of production, which includes the capture of labor-power 
for the generation of surplus-value, does not function autonomously, as a self-
contained unit separable from other aspects of society. Hence Marx’s famous 
distinction between the economic “base” of society its legal and political 
“superstructure.”11 Without entering into debates over the precise sense of 
this distinction and how the two relate, the basic point is that the economic 
sphere of production cannot function on its own.12 It ultimately requires a set of 
relatively external institutions and apparatuses in order to generate value from 
labor-power and to reproduce itself over time. 
 The language of “apparatus” comes from Louis Althusser, and his famous 
essay “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses.”13 Analyzing how the 
means of production reproduce themselves, Althusser as is well known makes 
a distinction between the Repressive State Apparatus (RSA) and Ideological 
State Apparatuses (ISAs). The RSA, as the name indicates, functions primarily 
through repression or violence, in the sense that it forms as a unified, centralized 
whole as a means of maintaining order over-against the otherwise disparate 
elements of society. So understood the RSA includes, among other things, “the 
Government, the Administration, the Army, the Police, the Courts, the Prisons, 
etc.”14 ISAs, in contrast, function primarily through ideological means as “distinct 
and specialized institutions.”15 Such institutions, as ISAs, tend to be more 
private than public, as is the RSA, and Althusser gives a list of the more crucial, 
including the religious ISA, the educational ISA, the family ISA, the legal ISA, 
the political ISA, the trade union ISA, the communications ISA, and the cultural 
ISA.16 The ISAs function separately, in terms specific to them, but in concert with 
each other to reproduce the means of production, which also means that the 
ruling class to a large extent controls them, at least in terms of ideology. Indeed, 
Althusser notes that it is virtually impossible for the ruling class to hold state 
power for an extended period of time without out also exercising hegemonic 
control over the ISAs. Althusser writes:
Each of them contributes towards this single result in the way proper 
to it. The political apparatus by subjecting individuals to the political 
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State ideology, the ‘indirect’ (parliamentary) or ‘direct’ (plebiscitary 
or fascist) ‘democratic’ ideology. The communications apparatus by 
cramming every ‘citizen’ with daily doses of nationalism, chauvinism, 
liberalism, moralism, etc, by means of the press, the radio and 
television. The same goes for the cultural apparatus (the role of 
sport in chauvinism is of the first importance), etc. The religious 
apparatus by recalling in sermons and the other great ceremonies 
of Birth, Marriage and Death, that man is only ashes, unless he loves 
his neighbour to the extent of turning the other cheek to whoever 
strikes first. The family apparatus . . . but there is no need to go on.17
Nevertheless, because of the role ISAs play in the reproduction of the means 
of production, they can also, Althusser notes, be “the site of class struggle, 
and often of bitter forms of class struggle.”18 I will return to the point in the 
conclusion. 
 Although the ISAs function in tandem, one usually plays a predominant 
role, and for Althusser this is the educational ISA, or the system of public and 
private schools. The State, Althusser writes:
takes children from every class at infant-school age, and then for 
years, the years in which the child is most ‘vulnerable’, squeezed 
between the Family State Apparatus and the Educational State 
Apparatus, it drums into them, whether it uses new or old methods, 
a certain amount of ‘know-how’ wrapped in the ruling ideology 
(French, arithmetic, natural history, the sciences, literature) or 
simply the ruling ideology in its pure state (ethics, civic instruction, 
philosophy). Somewhere around the age of sixteen, a huge mass 
of children are ejected ‘into production’: these are the workers or 
small peasants. Another portion of scholastically adapted youth 
carries on: and, for better or worse, it goes somewhat further, 
until it falls by the wayside and fills the posts of small and middle 
technicians, white-collar workers, small and middle executives, petty 
bourgeois of all kinds. A last portion reaches the summit, either to 
fall into intellectual semi-employment, or to provide, as well as the 
‘intellectuals of the collective labourer’, the agents of exploitation 
(capitalists, managers), the agents of repression (soldiers, policemen, 
politicians, administrators, etc.) and the professional ideologists 
(priests of all sorts, most of whom are convinced ‘laymen’).19
Portions of Althusser’s analysis, here, are obviously particular to his context, 
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France in the 1960s and 70s. Nevertheless, the basic point is that the educational 
system functions to impart the “know-how” required to reproduce the means of 
production via labor. Simply put, school prepares people for work. To quote him 
again:
They go varying distances in their studies, but at any rate they 
learn to read, to write and to add – i.e. a number of techniques, and 
a number of other things as well, including elements (which may 
be rudimentary or on the contrary thoroughgoing) of ‘scientific’ 
or ‘literary culture’, which are directly useful in the different jobs 
in production (one instruction for manual workers, another for 
technicians, a third for engineers, a final one for higher management, 
etc.).20
 
As Althusser also makes clear in these passages, the school system interpellates 
individuals into the reigning ideology unevenly or, perhaps better put, 
differentially. The overall function of the system is ideological, but since the 
sphere of production and the various apparatuses that support it depend upon 
a division of labor, the latter must also be incorporated into the educational 
ISA. Otherwise put, up to a certain point, schools do not teach all individuals 
the same thing, the same “know-how.” The educational ISA divvies up its 
ideologically-determined knowledge and necessary skills based on the interplay 
of aptitude, class, and social need. 
 Beyond specific ”know-how,” students also learn the various affective 
components necessary to be a “good worker” and, hence, productive member of 
society.
 But besides these techniques and knowledges, and in learning them, 
children at school also learn the ‘rules’ of good behaviour, i.e. the attitude that 
should be observed by every agent in the division of labour, according to the job 
he is ‘destined’ for: rules of morality, civic and professional conscience, which 
actually means rules of respect for the socio-technical division of labour and 
ultimately the rules of the order established by class domination. They also learn 
to ‘speak proper French’, to ‘handle’ the workers correctly, i.e. actually (for the 
future capitalists and their servants) to ‘order them about’ properly, i.e. (ideally) 
to ‘speak to them’ in the right way, etc.
 All in all, the purpose of schooling is to teach the sets of “necessary” skills 
and values required to reproduce the means of production. 
 Although Althusser primarily directs his attention to primary and 
secondary education, it can be applied to post-secondary education as well. 
Nevertheless, education so understood is closely tied to value, but primarily 
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externally. That is, the point of education is ultimately to funnel individuals into 
the realm of labor, where their labor-power can, in turn, function as an actual 
source of value. Schools, in other words, are not sources of value in and of 
themselves. They are certainly ideological training grounds, and in this sense are 
necessary for the reproduction of the means of production, given certain social 
arrangements and conditions. But on the whole that is really it: real value is not 
created in the schools but elsewhere, and through other means. 
 The same could be said, generally speaking, about most of the other ISAs. 
Sticking with the educational apparatus, however, it also seems to be the case 
that this externality is important for the functioning of ideology. Since schools 
are not directly related to value, other claims can be made for them, as a way 
of forcing the misrecognition that is usually thought to be required in order 
for ideology to function. Above and beyond its clear social function, that is, 
education can be conceived in lofty terms, as a means developing critical and 
creative thinking and of nurturing individual well-being and enlightenment. From 
within the framework that Althusser establishes, that education does not directly 
create value allows it to function as a more “noble” endeavor, free of the taint 
that often accompanies profit-seeking in the private, business sector. 
 The more noble view of education goes back at least to Plato, and it 
remains an essential selling-point for individuals and its overall social utility.20 
The motto of my own university, for instance, is “Transforming Education. 
Transforming Lives.” But anyone who works in education, and I am particularly 
concerned with higher education here, will likely see through much of the 
rhetoric. This is not so much due to cracks in the ideological function of 
education but, rather, to a shift in its function. The educational system still 
functions ideologically, and so Althusser’s analysis of it in terms of ISAs remains 
apt, at least on a certain level. Nevertheless, I would suggest that it is no longer 
external to the generation of value, in the sense that I outlined above. Rather, 
schools, and particularly institutions of higher education, now directly generate 
value, but often outside labor-power proper. They do so through numerous and 
varied means, but one of the primary ones is through debt. 
From Discipline to Control and Debt
In order to understand the shift, here, it is helpful to turn to Gilles Deleuze’s 
“Postscript on the Societies of Control,” in which he draws a distinction between 
disciplinary societies and control societies. The difference between the two, 
moreover, hinges on debt; he notes that, in control societies, ‘[a] man is no 
longer a man confined but a man in debt.”22 The significance of debt to control 
societies no doubt corresponds to its mobility and ubiquity. Deleuze notes 
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that in disciplinary societies, discipline is more contained and static, in that it 
is confined to the specific sphere of its influence, as Althusser maintained with 
ISAs. Discipline, of course, is one of the common threads that links institutions 
together, but it does so analogously: the school and the factory, for instance, 
are both disciplinary sites, but separately. No doubt they share a common 
denominator, and shape individuals accordingly, but they do so differently. The 
differences among domains may indeed and often do resonate to produce 
a whole, but the whole produced will always remain unstable, for the simple 
reason that individuals can and do move in and out of specific domains. As 
Deleuze puts it, in disciplinary societies “individuals are always going from one 
closed site to another, each with its own laws”; that is, “you were always starting 
over again (as you went from school to barracks, from barracks to factory.”23 
Another way to put the matter is to say that although in disciplinary societies 
discipline is widespread, it flounders on its inconsistency across domains and the 
gaps present in the passage among the latter. Confining discipline to discrete 
domains means that discipline is not all-confining, which is one of the reasons 
that Althusser can aver that ISAs may function as sites of class struggle, as 
mentioned above. 
 Debt fills in the gaps, rendering the distinction between disciplinary sites 
moot. In control societies, one still moves among the sites formerly marked as 
disciplinary. One still, in other words, passes from, between, and among family, 
school, work and a host of other apparatuses, which gives the appearance of 
the gap that Deleuze considers essential to disciplinary societies. But debt 
moves with individuals, floating above the various passages we make between 
institutions as a sort of general equivalent that loops back on said institutions, 
shaping them in its own image. 
 Given that debt functions as a general equivalent, Deleuze notes that the 
difference between disciplinary and control societies is best expressed in money. 
He writes that “discipline was always related to molded currencies containing 
gold as a numerical standard, whereas control is based on floating exchange 
rates, modulations depending on a code setting sample percentages for 
various currencies.”24 The difference between money understood hierarchically 
as grounded in a stable unit of account versus understood as determined 
immanently through its very ungroundedness correlates with the difference 
between discipline and control. That difference, moreover, extends throughout 
society as a whole, reshaping the way that institutions fashion individuals 
according to the demands of capital. Deleuze notes, for instance:
In the prison system: the attempt to find “alternatives” to custody, 
at least for minor  offenses,  and  the  use  of electronic  tagging  
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to  force  offenders  to  stay  at  home between certain hours. In 
the school system: forms of continuous assessment, the impact of 
continuing education on schools, and the related move away from 
any research in universities, “business” being brought into education 
at every level. In the hospital system: the new medicine “without 
doctors or patients” that identifies  potential cases and subjects  at 
risk and is nothing  to do with any progress toward  individualizing  
treatment, which  is  how  it’s  presented,  but is the  substitution  
for individual or numbered bodies of coded “dividual” matter to  
be controlled.  In the business system: new ways of manipulating 
money, products, and men, no longer channeled through the old 
factory  system. This is a fairly limited range of examples, but enough 
to convey what it means to talk of institutions breaking down: the 
widespread progressive introduction of a new system of domination.
Thus, as Steven Shaviro summarizes the difference between the two, “the 
disciplinary society is closed and hierarchical, [whereas] the control society is 
open, fluid, and rhizomatic.”25 
 Two things are important to emphasize here. First, the passage from 
discipline to control should not be understood in terms of replacement. 
Institutions may reshape themselves according to a new and different logic, but 
it is still those institutions that are being reshaped, and some of their former 
functions remain. The family, for instance, has undergone dramatic shifts as of 
late, as so-called traditional models of the family have been shattered by the 
explosion of new and different formations and the latter’s legitimate desire for 
recognition. Nevertheless, even in the case of “non-traditional” family structures, 
it is still the family that is in play, no matter how variegated it may be.26 Second, 
although control may not function top-down, concentrated in particular, 
socially sanctioned institutions, it still exercises a type of sovereignty over the 
individual—or dividual, to use Deleuze’s term—and it does so via debt. Disparate 
institutions may, at first glance, function in terms of their own, disciplinary laws, 
but debt renders any sort of autonomy they once had null and void. Debt moves 
among domains, is always with the individual, as a sort of supplement to his or 
her identity. 
 Debt as a supplement to identity in turn comes to supplement for 
identity itself, if Maurizio Lazzarato’s analysis is correct. According to Lazzarato, 
individuals under neoliberalism are essentially “indebted” individuals, in 
the sense that their subjectivity is constituted through the creditor-debtor 
relationship. That relationship is, according to Lazzarato, primary in both and an 
economic and moral sense, and because of this it functions as a “universal power 
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relation, because everyone is included within it.”27 It is this power of inclusion 
that enables debt to function as a generic means of generating value. Lazzarato 
writes, “Debt acts a ‘capture,’ ‘predation,’ and ‘extraction’ machine on the whole 
of society, as an instrument for macroeconomic prescription and management, 
and as a mechanism for income redistribution. It also functions as a mechanism 
for the production and ‘government’ of collective and individual subjectivities.”28 
It does so, however, through the appearance of freedom and opportunity, rather 
than in terms of repression or ideology, which is crucial to its universal function 
as a mechanism of control. As Lazzarato puts it, “The debtor is ‘free,’ but his 
actions, his behavior, are confined by the debt he has entered into. The same is 
true as much for the individual as for a population or social group. You are free 
insofar as you assume the way of life (consumption, work, public spending, taxes, 
etc.) compatible with reimbursement.”29 
 Because of its mobility, debt functions immanently throughout the social 
field, extracting value from individuals and institutions while fashioning them as 
indebted subjects. Indeed, it inserts itself into and shapes subjects through even 
the most mundane of actions, like carrying and using a credit card. Lazzarato 
notes, for instance, that we “carry within ourselves the creditor-debtor relation—
in our pockets and wallets, encoded in the magnetic strip on our credit cards. 
Indeed, this little strip of plastic hides two seemingly harmless operations: 
the automatic institution of the credit relation, which thereby establishes 
permanent debt. The credit card is the simplest way to transform its owner into 
a permanent debtor, an ‘indebted man’ for life.”30 But debt also parasites itself 
on existing institutions, to borrow a term from Michel Serres,31 and this is why the 
shift from discipline to control that Deleuze marks should not be understood in 
terms of replacement: debt, as a fundamental aspect of control societies, may 
change the shape of institutions, but only to the extent that those institutions 
can function as a means producing value via debt. 
Students and Parasites
Student loans for higher education provide a case in point, at least in the 
United States, to which my discussion will remain limited. It is common to 
say that under neoliberalism the character of education has shifted to align 
itself with the demands of a fully-realized money economy. Deleuze catches 
wind of this shift, when he notes, “Even the state education system has been 
looking at the principle of ‘getting paid for results’: in fact, just as businesses 
are replacing factories, school is being replaced by continuing education and 
exams by continuous assessment. It’s the surest way of turning education into a 
business.”32 
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 We can understand the business aspect of education in numerous ways. 
It can mean that that education primarily serves business interests, including 
teaching the skills necessary for employment in specific sectors. The teaching 
of such skills still often builds upon a broad-based, critical knowledge that 
has generally been associated with the liberal arts, but only to the extent 
that the latter serve clearly-defined ends, or “outcomes,” to use the language 
of accrediting bodies. Hence the promotion of a technical, career-oriented 
knowledge that is worked into general education curricula and partitioned 
along particular degree tracks. The re-orientation of higher education along 
these lines is a complex affair, and includes, among other things various types of 
corporate partnerships for vocational training programs, the increase in science- 
and technology-based industry that corresponds with an innovation economy, 
and the rise of corporate education conglomerates. These shifts blur the line 
between business and the university not just in terms of the goals of the latter 
but also in terms of its self-identity and how it is run. Educational institutions, 
in other words, become businesses, as they take on the organizational features 
of their corporate counterparts as a means to better position themselves 
in a crowded, competitive market. The value of academic labor, within this 
framework, coincides with an emphasis on outcomes and performance.33
 As should be clear, to call education a business is no mere metaphor or 
analogy but, rather, descriptive of its function, and this down to its main product, 
students. It is common to bemoan that education has become just one more 
sphere of consumption. Students, that is, treat education as a product which 
they consume, and that leads, of course, to a more pragmatic approach to 
learning combined with an unhealthy sense of entitlement. Administrators have, 
no doubt, encouraged this mentality by blurring the lines between business 
and education in the first place, but such a line of thinking tends to ignore that 
students are not just consumers but products as well or, more broadly, value-
generators.34 
 Students obviously play this role for colleges and universities themselves. 
Students generate value, in other words, directly for institutions in the form of 
tuition dollars and social capital, both of which can in turn be used or levied for 
capital reinvestment. The value of students, from this perspective, is theoretically 
limited in both economic and moral terms, however, given the non-profit status 
of the majority of universities in the United States.35 They also generate value 
for a host of internal and external players, as the economy which governs higher 
education is just as porous and intertwined as any other. 
 Nevertheless, the real value of students, I would argue, lies in debt. As of 
October 2016, some 43 million borrowers hold roughly $1.3 trillion in outstanding 
student loan debt, making it second only to mortgage debt among household 
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debt loads. Around two thirds of students in the United States take out some 
form of loans to finance higher education, though the amount obviously 
depends upon a host of factors, including the economic position of the borrower 
vis-à-vis cost of attendance. Nevertheless, among borrowers, a graduate of 
the class of 2016 left college or university $37,000 in the hole on average, a six 
percent increase from last year.36
 The student loan system in the United States does not, of course, present 
itself as designed to extract value from students, even if it is a highly profitable 
enterprise. It obviously benefits colleges and universities themselves, which 
profit from student loan debt directly in the form of tuition dollars. Most colleges 
and universities rely on student loan debt in one way or another and from a 
lesser to greater extent, though the for-profit higher education business in 
the United States has made student loan debt central to its business model. 
Vendors such as textbook companies and suppliers, food-service providers, and 
technology companies also profit secondarily from student loan debt, but the 
debt itself has its own industry. A host of debt servicers, refinance lenders, and 
financial firms profit directly, as does the federal government, by far the largest 
issuer and backer of student loans. Depending on which accounting method is 
used and at current rates, the federal government stands to make a profit of $88 
billion to $135 billion over a ten-year period.37
 That was not necessarily the original intent. The first public student loans 
issued in the United States were part of the National Defense Education Act 
(NDEA), which was signed into law on September 2, 1958. The NDEA provided 
across-the-board funding for higher education, including the extension of direct 
loans to students who could not otherwise afford to attend college or university. 
But, as the name of the act implies, funding for higher education, including 
the use of student loans, was not considered an end in and of itself (i.e. based 
on some romantic notion of education as essential to the cultivation of well-
grounded individuals and an informed public) but, rather, was inextricably tied to 
national security. Passed during the second decade of the Cold War, the NDEA 
begins with the following declaration, which is worth quoting at length:
The Congress hereby finds and declares that the security of the 
Nation requires the fullest development of the mental resources 
and technical skills of its young men and women. The present 
emergency demands that additional and more adequate education 
opportunities be made available. The defense of this Nation 
depends upon the mastery of modern techniques developed from 
complex scientific principles. It depends as well upon the discovery 
and development of new principles, new techniques, and new 
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knowledge.
 We must increase our efforts to identify and educate more 
of the talent of our Nation. This requires programs that will give 
assurance that no student of ability will be denied an opportunity for 
higher education because of financial need; will correct as rapidly as 
possible the existing imbalances in our education programs which 
have led to an insufficient proportion of our population educated in 
science, mathematics, and modern foreign languages and trained in 
technology.38
The NDEA allotted $47,500,000 in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1959, 
which increased to $90,000,000 by the end of fiscal year 1963. Although 
the act specified that such loans were to be reserved for students who could 
demonstrate need and ability to maintain good academic standing throughout 
the course of his or her study, it also specified special consideration for “(A) 
students with a superior academic background who express a desire to teach in 
elementary or secondary schools, and (B) students whose academic background 
indicates a superior capacity or preparation in science, mathematics, 
engineering, or a modern foreign language.”39
 The current system student loan system, however, has its roots in the 
Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA). Like its predecessor, it was a cold war 
plan to strengthen the resources of colleges and universities through increased 
funding. One of its main components, however, including making available 
various forms of financial assistance for students, including federally-guaranteed, 
low-interest student loans. Upon signing the HEA into law, Lyndon B. Johnson 
noted that it would allow “a high school senior anywhere in this great land of 
ours [to] apply to any college or any university in any of the 50 States and not 
be turned away because his family is poor.” He hoped the legislation would level 
the playing field, providing a way for those without means “to deeper personal 
fulfillment, greater personal productivity, and increased personal reward.” It also 
did not hurt that a more educated citizenry would “allow us to maintain our 
freedom in a highly competitive world.”40 
 The program has gone through various changes since its inception, which 
are too numerous to catalogue and do not affect the substance of it. Perhaps the 
most important change to the program occurred in the 1970s, when bankruptcy 
protections were removed to protect federal investments from potential abuse.41 
Nevertheless, whereas the student loan system previously functioned as a means 
of broadening the ideological and disciplinary reach of higher education under 
the guise of personal “fulfillment” and “reward,” it now functions as a means 
of control, materially in the form of debt. Lazzarato has noted this function of 
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higher education in the United States as well, referring to colleges as universities 
as a combined “factory of indebted students.”42 Indeed, for Lazzarato, “the 
American University is the ideal realization of the creditor-debtor relationship. 
. . . [T]he American student perfectly embodies the condition of the indebted 
man by serving as its paradigm for the conditions of subjectivation of the 
debt economy one finds throughout society.”43 More specifically, under the 
ideological guise of freedom, responsibility, financial security, and personal 
fulfillment, through student loan debt students come to understand themselves 
as permanent debtors. To quote Lazzarato again:
Students contract their debt by their own volition; then they quite 
literally become accountable for their lives and, to put it in the terms 
of contemporary capitalism, they become their own managers. 
Factory workers, like primary school students, are controlled within 
an enclosed space (the factory walls) for a limited time and by 
people who, and apparatuses, which remain exterior to them and 
are easily recognizable. To resist, they might rely on their own 
resources, on those of other workers, or on the solidarity between 
them. Control through debt, however, is exercised within an open 
space and an unlimited time, that is, the space and time of life itself. 
The period of repayment runs to twenty, sometimes thirty, years, 
during which the debtor is supposed to manage his life, freely and 
autonomously, in view of reimbursement.44
The “open” character of debt is what makes it an ideal form of control: whatever 
one does and wherever one goes, debt always follows. 
 Injecting debt into the higher education system as a means of control and 
value generation, however, is also extremely efficient, in the sense that its sweep 
is broad and without much resistance. Lazzarato, of course, notes that students 
contract debt by their own “volition,” but we should be attentive to the irony 
in that claim. “Freedom,” for Lazzarato, takes place within a pre-established 
horizon of expectations. As he puts it in The Making of the Indebted Man, “The 
debtor is ‘free,’ but his actions, his behavior, are confined to the limits defined by 
the debt he has entered into.”45 
 Such limitation, however, can also be extended to entering into a debt 
contract in the first place, specifically when it comes to educational loans. The 
terms of such contracts obviously favor the creditor, in the form of interest, but 
it also remains the case that any “choice” involved up front is severely hindered 
by a socio-economic system that more and more requires at least some amount 
of post-secondary education in order to secure gainful, stable employment. In 
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1965 some 5.9 million individuals sought a college degree; estimates for Fall 2016 
put enrollment at 20.5 million.46 Although certainly representative of greater 
access to higher education, that increase has coincided with decades of wage-
stagnation and ballooning tuition and other costs, which latter are partly the 
result of decreases in federal and state support combined with administrative 
bloat. Hence student loan debt, as a way of filling in the gaps. Given that, 
ideologically and materially, a degree remains an important stepping-stone to 
the so-called middle class, to ask students not to take out debt—or even to limit 
it as much as possible, which is often impossible—is not much of an option. 
 Increasingly, the choice to take on debt, and often astronomical amounts 
of it, to gain access to the benefits of higher education takes on the character of 
a Lacanian “forced choice.” For Lacan, the “forced choice” signifies the alienation 
of the subject in the symbolic order, through which its supposed freedom is 
constituted. The “forced choice,” that is, indicates the bind that the symbolic 
order puts the subject in, in the sense that any action that the subject might take 
is constrained in advance by factors outside the subject’s control. Lacan uses the 
example of the command “Your money or your life!” As Lacan comments, “If I 
choose money, I lose both. If I choose life, I have life without the money, namely, 
a life deprived of something.”47 We could say something similar with student 
loan debt. So long as a college degree remains, to a large extent, a prerequisite 
for gaining a modicum of economic security, contracting for debt is a necessity, 
at least for the majority of students. Deciding not to go into debt is to risk life 
itself. 
 It is, of course, the “forced” nature of student loan debt that makes 
students ideal hosts for the generation of value, in that when it comes down to 
it, there are few other options available to them. The student thus finds him- 
or herself in a parasitic relationship, one in which he or she has little room to 
manoeuver. It is a bit like Michel Serres’s reading of La Fontaine’s fable of “The 
Countryman and the Serpent,” in The Parasite. The fable, which is worth quoting 
in its entirety, goes:
A countryman, as Aesop certifies,
A charitable man, but not so wise,
One day in winter found,
Stretched on the snowy ground,
A chilled or frozen snake,
As torpid as a stake,
And, if alive, devoid of sense.
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He took him up, and bore him home,
And, thinking not what recompense
For such a charity would come,
Before the fire stretched him,
And back to being fetched him.
The snake scarce felt the genial heat
Before his heart with native malice beat.
He raised his head, thrust out his forked
tongue,
Coiled up, and at his benefactor sprung.
“Ungrateful wretch!” said he, “is this the way
My care and kindness you repay?
Now you shall die.” With that his axe he takes,
And with two blows three serpents makes.
Trunk, head, and tail were separate snakes;
And, leaping up with all their might,
They vainly sought to reunite.
It’s good and lovely to be kind;
But charity should not be blind;
For as to wretchedness ingrate,
You cannot raise it from its wretched state.48
A straightforward reading of the fable would emphasize the charitableness of 
the countryman, his concern for the snake’s well-being without apparent regard 
for recompense. The countryman’s act of goodwill contrasts sharply with the 
snake’s ungratefulness, manifest in the snake’s attempt to strike at the one who 
saved him. The fable, in this sense, praises the virtue of charity, but also cautions 
against overdoing it, of being mindful of how and to whom one gives. It is all well 
and “and good and lovely to be kind,” the fable reminds us, but it pays to be a 
bit shrewd when it comes to beneficence. “Charity should not be blind,” the fable 
moralizes, because no matter how one treats others, some will always care less 
and even show contempt. One cannot do much to dislodge an “ingrate” from his 
or her “wretched state”! 
 Serres, however, adopts what might be the snake’s perspective. Although 
the moralizing sense of the fable focuses works on the interplay between charity 
and gratitude, or in the case of the snake’s ungratefulness, Serres suggests that 
the snae “asked for nothing; he was hibernating perhaps.” Serres writes:
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The serpent is not a lessee; he was not looking for a haven; he 
was answered without having called. He was given an uncalled-for 
opinion. Someone made himself the serpent’s benefactor, savior, 
and father. You are sleeping quite peacefully, and when you wake up 
you find yourself in debt. You live with no other need, and suddenly, 
someone claims to have saved your country, protected your class, 
your interests, your family, and your table. And you have to pay him 
for that, vote for him, and other such grimaces. Thus the serpent 
awakens obliged to another.49 
From this perspective, the snake can appear as perfectly justified in its actions 
against the countryman. The fable on this reading is less about charity than the 
countryman’s attempt to extract value from an unwitting other, all under the 
guise of compassionate consideration. For this reason, “the host is less a host 
than he thought. Less hospitable than he thought.”50
 The parasitism present in the fable provides a way to understand the 
student loan system in the United States. Although ostensibly designed to 
benefit students, to give those in need a leg up by taking them out of the cold, 
so to speak, its real beneficiaries lie elsewhere. As mentioned above, the student 
loan system in the United States has always emphasized the private and social 
benefits of higher education. Student loans are thus a way of shuttling more 
individuals qua students into an increasingly variegated labor market, and in 
this sense serve as a means to discipline students to become value generators 
via work. So much is consistent with the function of Althusser’s ISAs, discussed 
above. But we should also take cognizance of the shift from discipline to control 
via debt. From this perspective, student loans do not just function as an external, 
preparatory mechanism but, rather, fashion individuals in terms of value separate 
from labor. In that separation, the student becomes a perpetual debtor but also 
a perpetual generator of value, above and beyond his or her labor-power. 
 Nevertheless, like the snake, this is a situation that students have not 
asked for. Bracketing the ideology of higher education that ties it with personal 
worth, the entire system is given in advance. Most systems, of course, are, but 
students who cannot afford to pay the ever-increasing costs of higher education 
have few real options available: prior to selling their labor-power, they now sell 
their value to private and federal creditors in the form of debt. When students 
do, eventually, enter the labor market, work becomes not only a means of 
generating value for the employer but, also, a means of gaining the necessary 
income to service contracted debt.51 Value generation is thus doubled.  Such is 
the basic parasitism of the student loan system in the United States. 
401
CONTINENTAL THOUGHT & THEORY: A JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 
Parasites on Unwilling Hosts: Student Loan Debt and the Generation of Value
Conclusion: The End of Debt and Value
I mentioned above Althusser’s claim that ISAs can function as sites of class 
struggle, and this has to do at least in part with the confined nature of discipline. 
The dispersal of debt throughout the social order, however, makes finding sites 
of struggle more difficult. It is still possible, of course, to organize around these 
sites, but such organization remains limited in advance to the extent that the 
function of the latter have shifted to control, to the generation of value via 
debt. As a mobile and dispersed form of control, debt is always there, always 
generating value—no matter the struggle. 
 Unless, that is, debt itself becomes the locus of struggle. The ubiquity of 
debt is what makes it an effective means of control and value-generation in the 
first place, but it is also its point of weakness. Debt can only generate value that 
it coincides with the promise of payment and, at some point, payment itself. 
Hence its contractual nature, and it is on this aspect of debt that the moralizing 
reading of La Fontaine’s fable depends. Without that promise, however, debt 
loses not only its ability to generate value but also, and just as significantly, its 
grasp on subjectivity. To struggle against debt, to make debt a site of struggle 
itself, thus takes the form of refusal, which for current student debtors means 
default. 
 In their book The Undercommons, Stefano Harney and Fred Moten use the 
image of the indebted student who refuses to pay as an indication of the “bad 
debt” that constitutes what they call “the undercommons,” a fugitive public that 
organizes itself in the cracks of and against existing regimes. They write:
The student is not home, out of time, out of place, without credit, in 
bad debt. The student is a bad debtor threatened with credit. The 
student runs from credit. Credit pursues the student, offering to 
match credit for debt, until enough debts and enough credits have 
piled up. But the student has a habit, a bad habit. She studies. She 
studies but she does not learn. If she learned they could measure her 
progress, establish her attributes, give her credit. But the student 
keeps studying, keeps planning to study, keeps running to study, 
keeps studying a plan, keeps elaborating a debt. The student does 
not intend to pay.52
That lack of intention, however, must be collectivized.53 As La Fontaine’s fable 
reminds us, a single snake is easily dispensed with, decapitated; an army of them 
is much harder to deal with. Until current and former students form collectives 
against their debt, however, indebtedness will remain their subjective and 
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